住房危机不需要更多“真理”,需要的是面对现实的政治勇气
当硅谷精英和纽约时报社论版都在用同一种供需框架解释住房危机时,他们共同忽略了房间里的大象:住房市场的失败不是因为供应太少,而是因为它从未真正按照教科书上的“市场”运行过。
核心观点:当前关于住房政策的公共辩论陷入了一种危险的简化论:一边是市场原教旨主义者将一切问题归结为“供应不足”,另一边是干预主义者幻想着政府能凭空变出房子,两者都用看似自洽的逻辑掩盖了真正的困境——住房从来不只是经济问题,而是权力分配、利益博弈和社会契约的混合体,任何试图用单一公式解决它的企图,都将以更深的危机告终。
最近一段在社交媒体上广为流传的住房政策论述,以教科书般的清晰性阐述了一个看似无懈可击的逻辑链条:租金由供需决定,政府无法大规模建房子,只有私人投资者有能力提供资本,所以解决问题的唯一路径是减少管制、允许投资者获利。这个链条如此简洁有力,以至于许多读到它的人——包括一些本来持相反立场的人——都感到了一种智力上的解放感。仿佛长期以来困扰城市、撕裂社区、压垮中产阶级的住房问题,终于被一个简单公式解开了。然而,这种解放感恰恰是最危险的信号。当一个复杂到涉及土地制度、金融系统、城市规划、代际公平、阶层流动的社会问题,被压缩成三句话就能讲完的论证时,几乎可以确定,这个论证省略掉的,正是最核心的部分。
让我们先承认这个论证中正确的部分。租金确实受供需影响,这一点没有争议。政府财政也确实无法负担数百万套新住宅的建设成本,这是数学。私人资本确实有动力进入住房市场,前提是利润可预期。这些前提都是真实的,但它们组合在一起推导出的结论——“放开管制,让市场来做”——却是一个精心挑选事实后构建的叙事,而非完整的真相。这个叙事刻意忽略了一个关键事实:美国的住房市场从来不是教科书描述的“自由市场”。它从一开始就是世界上最受补贴、最受政府干预的行业之一。联邦政府通过房贷利息抵扣每年向房主提供数千亿美元的隐性补贴,地方政府的区划法规和建筑许可制度制造了人为稀缺,联邦住房管理局和房利美房地美为按揭市场提供了巨大担保。这个市场不是被“管死”的,而是被无数层叠的补贴、优惠和特权精心塑造出来的。那么,当市场原教旨主义者说“让市场决定”时,他们真正想要的是哪种市场?是那个已经被扭曲了八十年的现状,还是某种纯粹理论的、从未存在过的模型?
更深层的问题在于,住房与其他商品之间存在一个根本区别:它绑定了土地。而土地是不可再生的,其价值高度依赖位置和周边公共投资。一套曼哈顿公寓和一套阿拉巴马农场的房子,物理面积相同,价格可能相差一百倍。这种差异不是由“建造成本”或“供需总量”决定的,而是由公共交通、学校质量、治安环境、就业机会、文化设施等公共品共同决定的。这些公共品的提供者是谁?是政府。因此,住房价格本质上是一种“公共价值的资本化”。当你的社区新建了一个地铁站,周边房价立刻上涨,这个涨幅中相当一部分是公共投资带来的,却落入了私人业主的口袋。这是一个结构性不公,但市场原教旨主义叙事完全回避了它。它假装住房只是“消费品”,无视它同时也是“投资品”,而且是利用了公共资源增值的投资品。
这种回避在实践中的后果是严重的。大量放松管制的努力,表面上是增加供应、降低价格,实际上往往变成了为高密度豪华开发打开绿灯,最终建成的单位价格远超普通家庭承受力。投资者当然喜欢可预测的利润,但如果可预测的利润只能通过建设高端楼盘来实现——因为这类项目审批快、利润率确定——那么增加供应并不会带来租金下降,而是带来租金的分层:高端市场饱和,中低端市场依然真空。旧金山和纽约过去十年都经历了建设热潮,但城市的中位数租金并未显著下降,相反,低收入社区的租金压力因士绅化而加剧。这不是供给定律的失败,而是供给定律在一个被分割成无数子市场、且每个子市场的准入规则都不同的系统中的表现。
因此,当前关于住房政策的辩论陷入了一个认知陷阱:双方都在试图用一把钥匙开所有锁。一边说“只要增加供应,一切都会好”,另一边说“只要加强租金管制,租户就能安全”。两者都有局部正确性,但都无法单独解决一个整体性的危机。真正需要讨论的,是一个更不讨喜、更政治化的问题:住房的“可负担性”危机,本质上是收入分配危机和公共服务分配危机的双重映射。当工资增长长期落后于生产率增长,当教育和医疗成本吞噬了家庭预算的越来越大部分,当城市公共品——好学校、安全社区、便利交通——高度集中在少数富裕社区时,住房危机就不仅仅是一个“不够建”的问题,而是一个“谁配住在哪里”的问题。这是政治问题,不是算术题。
对于投资者来说,他们当然希望监管的确定性和利润的可预测性。这个诉求本身是合理的。但如果这种确定性意味着他们可以无限期地将成本外部化——比如,建了楼却不需要为新增人口配套学校、公园和警察服务;比如,可以利用税法漏洞将利润合法地转移到低税率地区;比如,可以通过政治捐款影响地方规划委员会的决定——那么,这种“确定性”实际上是一种特权,而非市场规律的自然结果。住房市场的失败,不是因为管制太多或太少,而是因为管制和补贴被设计成了服务资本而非服务居民的形式。租金管制有副作用,但它在某些市场确实阻止了狂飙的租金将整个社区连根拔起;供应增加有效,但它需要与公共住房、租金补贴、社区土地信托等一系列工具组合使用,才能确保新增供应真正流向了最需要的人。
最危险的叙事不是错误的数据,而是正确的数据配上错误的框架。把住房危机简化成供需问题,就像把癌症简化成细胞增生。从某个角度看没说错,但它让你忽略了癌细胞的根本来源和全身性的应对策略。住房政策涉及土地所有权的政治学、金融系统的结构性问题、地方治理的碎片化、以及深层的阶级和种族隔离历史。任何试图绕过这些复杂性的“简单答案”,最终都会在现实中碰壁,而且碰壁的代价通常由最无力承担的人支付。当硅谷的精英们用TED演讲式的语言宣称“只要放开管制、降低税收、一切都由市场解决”时,他们不是在解决问题,而是在为一种特定形式的资本扩张——即他们的资本——争取更大的操作空间。这没什么可耻的,但假装这是“公共利益”的唯一正确解读,就值得警惕了。
真正的解决方案必须同时做三件事:承认私人资本在住房建设中的核心角色并为其创造稳定预期;通过公共手段(如包容性区划、土地税收、公共住房投资)确保新增供应的可负担部分;以及最终,打破地方社区对住房供应的否决权,将决策权从邻里级提升到城市或区域级。这三件事没有一件是轻松的,每一件都会得罪强大的既得利益群体。但这是唯一能接近问题核心的路径。而要做到这一点,我们必须首先拒绝所有版本的“简单答案”——无论它来自左派还是右派,来自学者还是维权者,来自硅谷还是华尔街。住房是城市文明的基石,它不应该成为任何人的意识形态玩具。
参考来源
- Now with my new data about hotels chains on my site http://hotelist.com I can now finally present you the best and worst hotels chains in the world according to overall rating
- 🏆 Best hotel chains:
- 1. Capella (8.97)
- 2. Bulgari (8.68)
- 3. Auberge (8.55)
- 4. Four Seasons (8.54)
- 5. Mandarin Oriental (8.54)
- 6. Aman (8.43)
- 7. Dorchester (8.21)
- 8. Kempinski (8.18)
- 9. Rosewood (8.13)
- 10. Peninsula (8.02)
- 🤬 Worst hotel chains:
- 1. Choice (5.16)
- 2. Wyndham (5.17)
- 3. Louvre (5.80)
- 4. Best Western (6.44)
- 5. Accor (6.74 )
- 6. Raddison (6.96)
- 7. IHG (7.02 )
- 8. Marriott (7.18)
- 9. WorldHotels (7.28)
- 10. Hilton (7.31) - https://nitter.net/levelsio/status/2057227524740931904#m
- I pulled Kevin Mullin's (CA-15) full FEC donor file. Here's what $166,000 from pharma buys you on the Energy & Commerce Committee. - https://www.reddit.com/r/RedwoodCity/comments/1ti1yfj/i_pulled_kevin_mullins_ca15_full_fec_donor_file/
- RT by @paulg: What every voter and apparently, the NY Times Editorial Board, should know about housing policy:
- 1. Rents reflect the balance of supply of apartments and demand for those apartments in a given area. That’s it; there’s no magic. If you want lower rents, you can hope for a recession that destroys jobs and, therefore, demand. Or you can add supply.
- 2. There is no amount of money that any big city government could feasibly spend that would add materially to supply. This is because, depending on the location, new apartments cost $250,000-1,000,000 to develop… building even a few hundred of those starts to stress any city budget, and many big cities need tens or hundreds of thousands.
- 3. On the other hand, investors (including pension funds and endowments, insurance companies, rich families, etc.) can collectively **easily** provide enough capital to build as much housing as we need **so long as they are confident they can get a reasonable return**.
- To get those investors to fund the creation of the housing our society needs, we must do two things:
- 1. Dramatically reduce the time & complexity associated with securing governmental permission to develop housing. This means reviewing and simplifying the overlapping regulations that constrain housing production: zoning codes, building codes, parking, ADA, etc. But it also means changing the cultures within the relevant governmental agencies from “default no” to “how can we help you?”.
- 2. Provide certainty around on-going regulation of apartment operations.
- The way investors get a return from building rentals is as follows: They hire managers to lease the apartments, collect the rents, pay operating expenses and any mortgage payments, and then send the investors the cashflow that remains.
- But governments all over the country have been restricting the manner in which apartment buildings can be operated in all kinds of ways.
- For example: Cities have been making it harder to screen tenants, while also making it much harder to evict tenants who don’t pay. You can see why both of those measures are politically popular. After all, who doesn’t want people to get second chances? And who wants anyone to get evicted? But, as a manager, the combination of those two regulations makes it much harder to predict, with any certainty, that the rent will get paid… and that makes it very difficult to get investors to provide capital to create more housing.
- Another example: Rent control. Again, I understand why renters love rent control and why politicians want to give it to them. But, if, as has been the case in NY, LA and San Francisco, city governments hold annual rent increases below the rate of growth in the operating expenses of the buildings, the cashflow payable to the investors shrinks… making them much less likely to invest capital in building more apartments.
- In conclusion: For ~every other good or service in the economy, we allow the market to function, and the result is that we have a surplus of choice at all price points (think of food or clothes or cars), which is spectacular for the consumer. If we want a surplus of choice at all price points in housing, we need to get comfortable with the idea of allowing the market to provide it.
- And that means allowing investors to build rental apartments *and* allowing them to operate those apartments in a manner consistent with making a reasonable profit.
- Remember: Every developer of rentals is either a landlord-in-waiting or hoping to sell to one. - https://nitter.net/moseskagan/status/2056394505566466181#m